Two competing election systems purport to be auditable and software independent: hand-marked paper ballots and paper ballots printed by machines called Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs). In this talk, I will discuss recent work with Andrew Appel and Philip Stark, arguing that BMDs are neither software independent nor meaningfully auditable by Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs). We also introduce two new conditions called contestability and defensibility that are necessary for an audit to confirm election results.
Dr. Richard DeMillo’s Bio
Richard DeMillo is the Charlotte B. and Roger C. Warren Professor of Computing at Georgia Tech. He founded and directs the Center for 21st Century Universities, Georgia Tech’s living laboratory for fundamental change in higher education. His research includes numerous articles, books and patents in software engineering, cryptography, and cyber security. He holds what is believed to be the only patent on breaking public key cryptosystems. He has served as a foreign election observer for the Carter Center and has served on boards of public and private cybersecurity and privacy companies, including RSA Security and SecureWorks. He is a fellow of both the Association for Computing Machinery and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.